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Introduction
Development organizations, charities, aid agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other institutions whose formal objective is to enhance welfare and reduce suffering around the world are regularly accused of providing biased analyses on the state of the world and to have their actions guided by their private benefits -such as attracting media attention, raising funds, or personal fame -rather than the public goods they are supposed to be after. The dramatic reversal of policy communications of this issue is illustrated by the following quotes from global NGOs (Oxfam) and international organizations (United Nations), both before and after the food crisis:
1 "US and Europe['s] surplus production is sold on world markets at artificially low prices, making it impossible for farmers in developing countries to compete. As a consequence, over 900 millions of farmers are losing their livelihoods." Oxfam International (2005) 2 "Higher food prices have pushed millions of people in developing countries further into hunger and poverty. There are now 967 million malnourished people in the world…." Oxfam International (2008) 3 "The long-term downward trend in agricultural commodity prices threatens the food security of hundreds of millions of people in some of the world's poorest developing countries." Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (2005) 4 "Rising food prices are bound to worsen the already unacceptable level of food deprivation suffered by 854 million people. We are facing the risk that the number of hungry will increase by many more millions of people." Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (2008) 5 1 See Swinnen (2010) for an elaborate and detailed documentation of this reversal of policy communication and argumentation that these quotes reflect an effective and dramatic shift in policy communications by these organizations. 5 policy (see. e.g. Jacobson, 2000; Hawkins, 2002; Strömberg, 2004; Besley and Burgess, 2001; Baron, 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007) . However, studies on international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, have focused almost exclusively on their lending and project implementation activities (see e.g. Aldenhoff, 2007; Dreher et al., 2009; Vaubel et al., 2007) . There are a series of recent studies on fundraising by NGOs and the impact of public and private funding on NGO activities and strategies (see e.g. Rose-Ackerman, 1982; Chau and Huysentruyt, 2006; Andreoni and Payne, 2003; Aldashev and Verdier, 2010) . For example, Aldashev and Verdier (2010) , and Andreoni and Payne (2003) model the NGOs trade-off in allocating resources (time or funds) to fundraising. Allocation of resources to fundraising is needed to attract funds, but takes away resources from project implementation. This may lead to inefficient outcomes.
However none of these studies addresses the nature of and possible bias in communication by these organizations.
Our paper analyzes how communications to potential donors in fundraising affects the overall communication strategy of the organization, i.e. we analyze the nature of fundraising rather than its amount (in terms of either budget or time). Our model builds on the seminal work of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) on bias in mass media and of Andreoni and Payne (2003) on fundraising by charity organizations. We model how 'policy organizations' compete for donors' funding. To receive more funding, they may introduce 'bias' into their policy communications by slanting the content of their reports. Bias in policy communication may draw in larger revenues through fundraising, but it may have negative welfare effects if it induces suboptimal behavior by various other agents who use this advice for their decisionmaking.
the views of the median voter. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006, p. 3) develop a "slant" index, which measures "differences in news content that … would tend to increase a reader's support for one side of the political spectrum". 
2.
Conceptual Framework 
The Model
The variable ‫ݐ‬ represents the true state of the economy, e.g. the impact of an earthquake, global warming, or rising food prices. We normalize the true state of the economy to zero ‫ݐ(‬ ൌ 0). Donors, indexed by ݅, hold certain beliefs ܾ about this situation ‫,ݐ‬ and these beliefs may be biased. If ܾ 0 donor ݅ has an optimistic belief about the state of the economy, whereas if ܾ ൏ 0 the donor holds a pessimistic belief. To start, we assume that these beliefs are exogenous; later we relax this assumption and allow for beliefs to be endogenously determined.
Two POs, indexed by ݆ ‫א‬ ሼ‫,ܣ‬ ‫ܤ‬ሽ, collect (the same) data on the state of the economy ‫.ݐ‬ We assume that POs perform correct analyses, i.e. they gather the necessary information and use appropriate methodologies to arrive at the correct conclusion ݀ about the state of the economy ሺ݀ ൌ ‫ݐ‬ሻ. The POs communicate their conclusions to the external world by means of 'reports', containing information ݊ . We assume POs may introduce an amount of slanting ‫ݏ‬ in their policy communications, so their reports contain information ݊ ൌ ݀ ‫ݏ‬ .
Donors
We follow Andreoni and Payne (2003) In line with Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005) , we assume that on the one hand donors dislike slanted reports because it is costly both in effort and time to read a slanted report and 'to figure out the truth'. On the other hand, donors get disutility from reading reports that are inconsistent with their beliefs. Formally, a donor ݅'s utility of reading the report of PO ݆ and consequently donating to PO ݆ is: 
where ‫ݑ‬ ௪ is the 'warm glow' a donor receives from donating (see Andreoni and Payne, 2003) . If a donor does not read any report, and consequently does not donate, he receives zero utility. The constant ߤ 0 is a measure for a donor's sensitivity to slanting; therefore ‫ݏߤ‬ ଶ represents the disutility from reading a slanted report issued by PO ݆. ߶ 0 represents a donor's preference for reading a report consistent with his beliefs, where consistency is modeled as the distance between the report's content ݊ and the donor's beliefs ܾ , i.e.
Policy Organizations
As discussed before, the POs' policy communication has two objectives. On the one hand, POs' reports serve the purpose of fundraising; on the other hand they aim at improving government policy through their reports. The PO chooses its slanting strategy ‫ݏ‬ and the donation ‫ܦ‬ it requests to maximize its objective function ܹ ൫݊ ൯, which is the weighted sum of revenues, ܴ ൫݊ ൯ and policy impact, ‫ܫ‬ ൫݊ ൯. The objective function of PO ݆ is
where ߱ ோ and ߱ ூ are the respective weights of revenues and policy impact. The revenues ܴ ൫݊ ൯ are the funds collected from donors who decide to donate to PO ݆ after reading its report. The policy impact, ‫ܫ‬ ൫݊ ൯ is specified as ‫ܫ‬ ൫݊ ൯ ൌ ‫ܩ‬ െ ൫݊ െ ‫ݐ‬൯², with ‫ܩ‬ 0 being the policy impact of a report that is not slanted. We abstract from the complexities of the decision-making process of governments and assume they choose better policies when receiving better (i.e. less slanted) information from the reports. The policy impact is decreasing in the distance between the report's contents ݊ and the true situation ‫.ݐ‬
The sequence of the game is the same as in Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005) . First, the POs simultaneously announce their slanting strategies ‫ݏ‬ . Second, they simultaneously announce their requested donations ‫ܦ‬ , after the POs have revealed their slanting strategy.
Third, donors decide whether and to which PO to donate, based on the utilities associated with the respective strategies ‫ݏ‬ and requested donations ‫ܦ‬ . Fourth, POs finish their analyses of the state of the world, i.e. they find ݀, and report information ݊ ൌ ݀ ‫ݏ‬ . Fifth, if donors support a PO, they read the report and receive utility.
Equilibrium with Homogeneous Biased Donors
In this section we discuss the POs' optimal slanting strategy when all donors hold the same beliefs, i.e. ܾ ൌ ܾ for all i, where ܾ may be different from ‫.ݐ‬ The number of donors is normalized to one. The POs' equilibrium slanting strategy when donors have homogenous beliefs, ‫ݏ‬ ,
‫כ‬
, is summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1: If donors have homogenous beliefs, the equilibrium slanting strategy of both POs ݆ ൌ ‫,ܣ‬ ‫ܤ‬ is: In the next sections, we extend the model in three directions. First, we introduce heterogeneity in donors' beliefs and derive the POs' equilibrium slanting strategy. Second, we examine how the POs' slanting strategy is affected when the donors' willingness to 9 The absolute value of s ୨, ‫כ‬ reflects the fact that the impact of these factors is symmetric for s ୨, 10 One could make this trade-off more explicit by assuming that ߱ ோ ߱ ூ ൌ ܿ where ܿ is a constant. This would make the trade-off even stronger since a change in one of the weights would simultaneously imply an opposing change in the other weight. The effect of a change in one weight would hence be reinforced by the effect of the subsequent change in the other weight. donate is affected by the nature of the policy and by economic conditions. Finally, we analyze the impact of endogenous beliefs on POs' slanting strategies, both when beliefs are influenced by policy communication and by mass media.
Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Donors
In the previous section we assumed that all donors hold the same beliefs. In reality donors may vary in their beliefs and may disagree on the interpretation of a situation or on how a PO should handle it. Such heterogeneity could come from ideological differences or from being based on different information sources.
To formally model this heterogeneity, we assume that donors' beliefs are uniformly 
Proposition 2 implies both POs slant their reports but no longer in the same direction as with homogeneous donors. PO ‫ܣ‬ reports the situation to be more negative than it is in reality whereas PO ‫ܤ‬ reports the situation to be more positive. Importantly, unlike in the case of 
Problem Severity
So far we have assumed that donors' direct utility of donating, the 'warm glow' ‫ݑ‬ ௪ , is independent from the severity of the problems on which POs report and solicit donations for.
This implicitly assumes that donors draw the same 'warm glow' from, for example, helping the victims of a local flood that made a few rich people having to leave their house for a few days and an earthquake that killed thousands of people and made millions of poor homeless.
As this example illustrates, it is not unconceivable that donors draw more utility if their donations have larger welfare impacts. We therefore extend our model with homogenous donor beliefs to account for 'problem severity' in the donors' 'warm glow' utility of donating.
POs' inform donors about the severity of the problems for which they solicit donations through their reports' contents ݊ ൌ ݀ ‫ݏ‬ . Formally, we assume that the warm glow component in the donors' utility function equals ‫ݑ‬ ௪ ൫݊ ൯ ൌ ‫ݑ‬ ௪ െ ߙ݊ , where ߙ is a scalar which measures the donors' warm glow from supporting a PO that addresses more severe problems. For example, if PO ݆ reports that it deals with a more negative situation (݊ ൏ 0 and larger in absolute value), utility from donating to this PO is higher. 13 The POs' optimal slanting behavior when donors care about 'problem severity' and their beliefs are homogenous, ‫ݏ‬ ,ఈ ‫כ‬ ,is summarized in Proposition 3. To focus specifically on the impact of the extensions in the next sections, we consider homogenous donors.
Proposition 3: If donors care about contributing to solving more severe problems, the equilibrium slanting strategy of PO j, with ݆ ൌ ‫,ܣ‬ ‫,ܤ‬ is:
and POs depict situations as being more negative:
‫כ‬
Comparing the optimal slanting strategies in Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 indicates that, when donors derive more utility from contributing to more severe situations, POs tend to 
Endogenous Beliefs
So far, we have assumed that donors' beliefs are exogenously determined. However, it is more realistic to consider that donors' beliefs are not static. People may change their opinion on a certain issue, for example, because they receive additional information that is not in line with their beliefs. Such new information may come from the POs' communication themselves, or from other sources, such as the mass media. We first consider the impact of POs' communication and then of mass media on beliefs.
Beliefs Influenced by Policy Communication
The 
Equation (8) implies that beliefs converge to a finite and negative value after a sufficiently long time period, given that all other factors remain constant. Because POs slant their reports in a negative direction to attract more support from donors that prefer contributing to more severe problems, donors' beliefs converge to some negative value. In the long run, the equilibrium slanting by POs converges to the same value as the long run
A very important implication of Proposition 4 is that the initial exogenous beliefs ܾ do not matter in the long run. The impact of ܾ decreases over time and eventually disappears. This also implies that even if initial beliefs are correct ሺܾ ൌ 0ሻ, beliefs become biased over time and converge to some negative value, due to the fact that unbiased beliefs are updated with slanted reports.
The result in Proposition 4 depends on the assumption that donors prefer to contribute to more serious problems. Because POs are aware of this preference, they depict situations as more problematic than they are to draw in more donations, which in turn alters the beliefs of donors. From Equation (8) it follows that if donors do not value giving to more severe situations ሺߙ ൌ 0ሻ, beliefs converge to the actual situation ሺܾ ߬ ൌ ‫ݐ‬ ൌ 0ሻ and slanting disappears as well.
Beliefs Influenced by Mass Media
We now analyze how slanting by POs is influenced when donors update their beliefs with information provided by other sources. We focus on mass media. 14 14 In general, there are two important, but distinct, mechanisms at work in the interaction between POs and the mass media. The first mechanism is the desire of POs to appear in the mass media in order to raise funds and strengthen their legitimacy. The second mechanism is the impact of stories that appear in the mass media on the policy communications of POs through their impact on donors' beliefs. Mass media may play an important role in shaping donors' beliefs about situations in the world. In this paper we focus only on the second mechanism. A rapidly growing literature documents other effects of mass media on development such as its effect on Media attention is typically concentrated around 'events' or 'shocks' (Swinnen and Francken, 2006) . 15 Mass media's impact on donors' beliefs is determined by its broad audience and the relative speed of mass media coverage. Typically mass media can bring news reports much faster than a report from a PO that may require substantially more time for a thorough analysis of the situation and corresponding policy communications.
To analyze this, define ݉ as the content of the mass media's reports. Given the fact that mass media are faster at covering sudden events, we assume that mass media reports have a strong influence on shaping donors' initial beliefs. To simplify the analysis, we further assume (a) that donors have no prior beliefs on the issue before the media reports, (b) that they discount media reporting, expecting a certain exaggeration, and (c) that media only influence initial beliefs. In this case, ܾ ൌ ߛ ݉ where ߛ 0 is a 'discount factor', and political accountability (e.g. Besley and Burgess, 2001; Djankov et al., 2003) and its impact on reducing corruption in public policy (Francken et al., 2008; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005) . 
In the long run donor beliefs and slanting converge to a biased equilibrium:
Equation (9) implies that mass media reports influence the POs' initial policy communications since
0. This simple comparative statics result shows that POs slant their reports in the same direction as media attention. As a consequence, the generally recognized tendency of the mass media to focus on the negative aspects of a story ሺ݉ ൏ 0ሻ induces POs to slant their reports negatively, i.e. ‫ݏ‬ ,ఛୀ ‫כ‬ ൏ 0. However, in the long run the effect of the media reports on slanting disappears (Equation (10)). Thus, in the long run when mass media no longer report on the situation, the mass media's effect on slanting fades out. Hence, negative mass media reports on a situation initially induce POs to slant their reports' contents negatively, but in the long run this impact wanes.
16 16 This argument is related to the agenda setting effect of the media in international and aid policy, sometimes referred to as the 'CNN factor' (Hawkins, 2002) . It refers to the process by which the media influences policy by invoking responses in their audiences through concentrated and emotionally based coverage, which in turn applies pressure to governments to react (potentially through POs). Similarly, the absence of media coverage reduces priority in agenda-setting (Jakobson, 2000) . In this logic, public officials react to media news because they see it as a reflection of public opinion (Kim, 2005) . Some have questioned the importance of these effects (Natsios, 1996) and argue that the media is more likely to follow politics than lead it (Strobel, 1996) . A more nuanced argument is forwarded by Robinson (2001) who explains that the media can be a powerful source in leading policy makers but primarily when there is great uncertainty or limited information. This is consistent with our argument that media is more likely to influence initial beliefs. Several studies have analyzed the impact of media coverage of poverty, humanitarian crises, and natural disasters on humanitarian and foreign aid flows. Van Belle, Rioux and Potter (2004) and Kim (2005) find that a higher level of media attention to developing fundraising, but it may have negative effects as policy advice is also biased.
Our analysis shows that policy organizations do not slant their reports only under very restrictive, and unrealistic, conditions. Only when (1) donors' beliefs are homogenous; (2) donors' beliefs are unbiased; and (3) donors' utility is not affected by the severity of the problem, policy organizations do not slant their reports. However, in all other cases POs will countries problems leads to more aid in several developed countries. Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) argue that disaster relief decisions and aid allocations are driven by media coverage of disasters but that other newsworthy events may crowd out this news coverage. Third, when accounting for problem severity, i.e. when donors prefer donating to policy organizations that (claim to) address more severe problems, our model showed that policy organizations depict situations as being more negative than they actually are, even when donors' beliefs are unbiased.
Fourth, when donors' beliefs are endogenous this affects slanting. When donors update their beliefs with the policy communications of the organizations, both donors' beliefs and the policy organizations' slanting converge to a biased equilibrium. An important finding is that the initial beliefs do not matter, and that even if these initial beliefs were correct they become biased over time.
Mass media may play an important role in influencing donors' beliefs, in particular initial beliefs. When initial beliefs are influenced by mass media reports, these mass media reports induce POs to slant their reports. In the long run this impact disappears if donors update their beliefs with information from other sources.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 resembles the proof of a Hotelling model where firms compete on prices after choosing their location, and transportation costs are quadratic (see also Mullainathan & Schleifer, 2005) . We consider only the situation where the POs choose linear slanting strategies. Define
to be the strategy of PO ݆ that slants around point ‫ݖ‬ .
We proceed with backward induction.
i. We calculate ‫ܦ‪ሺ‬ݔ‬ , ‫ܦ‬ ; ‫ݖ‬ , ‫ݖ‬ ሻ, i.e. the bias of the donor who is indifferent between donating to the two POs if PO ݆ charges ‫ܦ‬ and slants around point ‫ݖ‬ (chosen in the first stage of the game and taken as given in this stage).
ii. We then calculate ‫ܦ‬ ோ ሺ‫ܦ‬ ; ‫ݖ‬ , ‫ݖ‬ ሻ and ‫ܦ‬ ோ ሺ‫ܦ‬ ; ‫ݖ‬ , ‫ݖ‬ ሻ, the best response functions for PO ‫ܣ‬ and ‫ܤ‬ respectively.
iii. Using these response functions, we calculate the equilibrium donations ‫ܦ‬ ‫כ‬ ሺ‫ݖ‬ , ‫ݖ‬ ሻ and ‫ܦ‬ ‫כ‬ ሺ‫ݖ‬ , ‫ݖ‬ ሻ and market share ‫ݔ‬ ‫כ‬ ሺ‫ݖ‬ , ‫ݖ‬ ሻ that result from the choice of slant in the first stage.
iv. We then use these equilibrium donations to show that in the first stage, at ‫ݖ‬ ൌ (A.39)
